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PRAGMATISM REGAINED 
Christopher Kutz* 
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE. By Jules Coleman. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 2001. Pp. xx, 226. $39.95. 
I. FROM PRACTICE TO THEORY 
Jules Coleman's The Practice of Principle1 serves as a focal point 
for current, newly intensified debates in legal theory, and provides 
some of the deepest, most sustained reflections on methodology that 
legal theory has seen. Coleman is one of the leading legal philosophers 
in the Anglo-American world, and his writings on tort theory, contract 
theory, the normative foundations of law and economics, social choice 
theory, and analytical jurisprudence have been the point of departure 
for much of the most interesting activity in the field for the last three 
decades. Indeed, the origin of this book lies in Oxford University's in­
vitation to Coleman to deliver the Clarendon Lectures in Law in 1998, 
one of the greatest honors for legal scholars. Moreover, unlike many 
law school "legal theorists," Coleman's high standing within the legal 
academy is fully matched in the professional philosophical world. 
Practice will surely be mined for years for its many and subtle discus­
sions of the nature of law and legal argument. The book is a wonderful 
achievement, both for Coleman himself, and for the development of 
rigorous philosophical study of the law. 
Coleman's first publication, "On the Moral Argument for the Fault 
System," appeared in the · flagship Journal of Philosophy at a time 
when work on first-order problems of law - as opposed to second­
order questions about the nature of law - was frequently disparaged 
by professional philosophers as mere "application."2 Coleman's early 
writings helped significantly to change that, by showing that deep 
philosophical issues of responsibility and justice were raised by our le-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, Boalt Hall 
School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. B.A. 1989, Yale; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 
1996, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1997, Yale. - Ed. I am grateful to Jules 
Coleman and Mark Greenberg for their very helpful comments. Some of the material in this 
Review will also appear in the Times Literary Supplement. 
1 .  Jules Coleman is Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence and Profes­
sor of Philosophy, Yale University. 
2. Jules L. Coleman, On the Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473 
(1974). 
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gal practices and that our concepts of justice and fault could not be 
fully understood apart from those practices. What Coleman brought to 
the field of legal philosophy was both the conceptual rigor of his 
graduate training at Rockefeller University as well as an interest in 
and sensitivity to the way risk and responsibility are actually allocated 
through tort law. In his own work, and in fostering the work of others, 
Coleman has greatly expanded the range and interest of legal philoso­
phy, moving beyond the mainstays of jurisprudence and constitutional 
law to the private law of tort and contract. 
His 1992 book, Risks and Wrongs, set out his general view of those 
fields.3 Coleman argued that tort doctrine must be understood as the 
institutionalization of a distinctive moral view, "corrective justice," ac­
cording to which wrongdoers bear duties to rectify the wrongful losses 
they inflict on their victims. Such a view is opposed, on the one hand, 
to the strict liability view put forward by Richard Epstein,4 according 
to which causing harm, faultlessly or not, suffices for liability; and on 
the other to the economic theory of tort, whose chief proponents are 
Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi,5 according to which liability 
properly rests with the party best able to reduce the costs of both acci­
dents and accident prevention, independent of any causal or faulty re­
sponsibility for the accident. By contrast, Coleman's interpretation of 
contract law rejected seeing it as embodying a distinctive moral con­
ception (as, for example, Charles Fried has influentially argued6). 
Rather, argues Coleman, contract law is best understood functionally, 
as a piece of a more general liberal political theory. With the econo­
mists, Coleman sees contract law's chief justification in its facilitation 
of economic markets. But where the economists see the chief value of 
markets as lying in their promotion of allocative efficiency, Coleman 
understands their virtues in richer, more political terms: markets per­
mit social cooperation in the circumstances of liberal societies, that is, 
divisive pluralism and individual freedom. 
Coleman's argument in that earlier work reflects a general claim, 
that abstract concepts must be understood in terms of the practices 
they structure. This claim is a hallmark of philosophical pragmatism 
and has been implicit in most of Coleman's writing. Now he has 
paused to make it explicit, and to show how other, related, theses of 
philosophical pragmatism help to illuminate and ground the substan­
tive positions he has advanced over the years. 
3. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992). 
4. Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). 
5. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); RICHARD POSNER & 
WILLIAM LANDES, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF TORT LAW (1987). 
6. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). 
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The Practice of Principle is, in effect, two books. The first returns 
to the subject of tort law. Here Coleman's concern is not setting out 
his substantive view of tort law, although this work does provide an 
opportunity for him to knit together his corrective justice view with 
some other recent work coauthored with Arthur Ripstein, setting out 
an account of the relation between corrective and distributive justice.7 
Rather, Coleman's concern is methodological, with the question of 
what kind of account of a body of law should be deemed an adequate 
explanation. In this half of the book, Coleman's principal adversary is 
named "the economic approach to law," and represents not any par­
ticular figures, but rather a theoretical commitment to explaining and 
justifying legal institutions in terms of the economic value of effi­
ciency. Coleman hopes to offer an exceedingly ambitious argument: 
not just that his corrective justice account of tort law is superior to the 
economists', but that only an account like his, one that takes the inter­
nal structure of tort law seriously, could ever be a contender. 
The second "book" takes up questions of general, or "conceptual" 
jurisprudence: what is law, what authority does it have, and how is law 
possible? Again, the point of Coleman's discussion here is not to pres­
ent new substantive answers to these questions, but rather to show 
how a position he originally put forward twenty years ago, in "Nega­
tive and Positive Positivism,"8 can draw upon a broader pragmatic ap­
proach to overcome powerful objections raised against his and similar 
accounts. Legal positivism, at the most general level, involves the 
claim that law is grounded ultimately and only in social facts, where 
"social facts" include conventions, practices, and beliefs. But positiv­
ists have disagreed whether moral criteria - tests of moral goodness 
- can be incorporated into the conventions defining a community's 
law, with Coleman (following H.L.A. Hart) arguing for a capacious 
view, while Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro argue that moral tests can 
never partly constitute a community's law without undermining the 
basic function of law, guiding conduct.9 Coleman also takes the occa­
sion to defend the general project of conceptual jurisprudence against 
two objections voiced by Ronald Dworkin and Brian Leiter, who criti­
cize positivism for, on the one hand, an impossible pretence of value­
neutrality; and on the other of poaching on the proper territory of so­
cial scientists in claiming to illuminate a form of social organization. 
This Review will touch on the larger themes of Coleman's book, 
but it cannot do justice to all its contents, for Practice is dense and 
7. Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 
(1995). 
8. Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982), 
reprinted in JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3 (1988). 
9. See JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW 37, 50-51 (1979); Scott Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, 4 LEGAL THEORY 469 (1998). 
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rich, with new arguments appearing on almost every page. It is also a 
difficult book, in great part because of the conceptual difficulties of 
the issues Coleman considers, and the great range of theoretical con­
siderations he brings to bear on those issues. While the general subject 
matter should be of interest to anyone working in legal theory, 
broadly speaking, the detail and rigor of its arguments may leave non­
specialists a little dazed.10 But for those with a serious interest in the 
field of legal philosophy, this is a must-read. Even those who reject 
Coleman's methods and substantive claims will benefit from the char­
acteristic lucidity and incisiveness with which he sketches rival posi­
tions, alternatives, and problems for the field. 
Just as important, a signal virtue of Coleman's book is the excite­
ment it embodies about the state of the field. The book vibrates with 
critical engagement, with both arguments and authors. The reader has 
the impression of being invited to a particularly lively philosophy 
seminar, whose members are both familiar (e.g., Ronald Dworkin) 
and relatively new (e.g., Scott Shapiro). On every page Coleman is 
confronting, criticizing, and endorsing others' views, as well as ex­
plaining how his own views have shifted over time. The consequence 
of this strongly dialectical approach is that the book does not really 
purport to present definitive answers to the problems it treats; 
Coleman's views will likely shift again in the future. The book, then, 
offers a snapshot of Coleman's mind and the debates his work drives. 
In that sense, the book may seem less satisfying than the traditional 
philosophical treatise, in which the appearance of finality is scrupu­
lously maintained by the rhetoric of the obviousness of the author's 
conclusions. Coleman's approach is, by contrast, refreshingly honest. 
The problems are hard, and a philosopher would be a fool to think his 
or her views the final words on the matter. 
II. PRAGMATISM, PRINCIPLE AND TORT 
According to Coleman, The Practice of Principle is supposed to 
both exemplify and explain philosophical pragmatism as applied to le­
gal theory (p. xi). Because pragmatism is, to varying degrees, the uni­
fying thread of this book, it is worth getting clear from the start what 
Coleman means - and does not mean - by it. For "pragmatism" is a 
word much in vogue in legal academia. A recent Westlaw search turns 
up nearly 200 law journal articles with "pragmatic" or "pragmatism" 
in the title,11 on subjects ranging from administrative law,12 to envi-
10. The book has one serious defect: a virtual absence of specific references to the cur­
rent literature, including the works of authors Coleman discusses at length. This is particu­
larly unfortunate because it excludes interested readers who might otherwise find this a 
helpful introduction to contemporary debates in this field. 
11 .  Search on Westlaw (JLR database), conducted Feb. 10, 2002. 
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ronmental law,13 to voting rights law,14 not to mention at least two spe­
cial symposia specifically noting the emergence of pragmatism.15 These 
articles range in theoretical depth, and it is fair to say in many that 
"pragmatic" functions as a five-dollar synonym for "practical." Others 
invoke a more general methodological stance, one that abjures argu­
ments from pure principle in the spirit of compromise - in David 
Luban's characterization, this is pragmatism as "eclectic, re­
sult-oriented, historically minded antiformalism."16 
Even among the more reflective proponents of "legal pragma­
tism," the term seems to denote a waiver of the requirements of 
producing systematic theory, in favor of a bricolage of independently 
plausible theoretical assumptions and principles, balanced 
against intuitively reasonable outcomes. Daniel Farber's recent 
Eco-Pragmatism is typical: "Legal pragmatists are, in part, reacting 
against the increased obsession of some other legal scholars with 
grand theories such as economic reductionism . . . .  We can have better 
hopes of building an interlocking web of arguments that will support a 
decision based on diverse, overlapping considerations."17 There may 
indeed be good reasons to avoid difficult theoretical work in particular 
times and places: not all debates happen in seminar rooms, nor is the 
solitary cool of the study the appropriate forum for hammering out 
policy among parties with sharply conflicting interests and conceptions 
of the good.18 Moreover, because philosophical theories by their na­
ture are general and tend to underdetermine particular policy conclu­
sions, it is often possible at the policy-making level to reach consensus 
on particular decisions without needing to square all theoretical 
premises. However, such pragmatism, or better "legal pragmatism," 
stands generally to philosophical pragmatism as "legal realism" stands 
to philosophical realism, which is to say that the resemblance largely 
stops at the orthography. For philosophical pragmatism represents a 
12. Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rule­
making, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2000). 
13. Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421 
(2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-PRAGMATISM (1999)). 
14. J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influenced Districts and the Pragmatic Tradi­
tion in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 551 (1993). 
15. See Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 
(1996). 
16. David Luban, What's Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 
44 (1996). 
17. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 9-10 (1999). 
18. The case for practical agreement amid theoretical disagreement has been well made 
recently by CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
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constellation of semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical claims, 
most of which derive directly or indirectly from arguments about the 
relations between theory and evidence,19 and from the priority of in­
terpretation to metaphysics.20 In its philosophical form, therefore, 
pragmatism represents a deeply-considered theoretical framework, a 
framework congenial to a wide-range of substantive ethical and legal 
positions. 
Coleman's pragmatism is of the latter flavor, and the book may 
come as a shock to those seeking the usual pass from theory. Accord­
ing to Coleman, philosophical pragmatism is characterized by the fol­
lowing five claims or characteristics: (1) "semantic non-atomism": the 
idea that meanings reside not in individual concepts but holistically, in 
networks of concepts, so that for example the meaning of "fault" can 
only be explicated in terms of the related concepts of "harm,'' 
"agency,'' and "remedy," related inferentially to the term to be ex­
plained; (2) "practical inferential role semantics": the meaning of con­
cepts is given by the inferences they support in the practices in which 
they occur; (3) "explanation by embodiment": normative principles 
are explained by showing the practices in which they occur; (4) "con­
ceptual holism": what role a concept plays in one practice depends on 
its role in other, related practices; and (5) "radical revisability": all be­
liefs, both theoretical and empirical, are open to revision on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds (pp. 6-7). 
Taken together, these claims add up to a distinctive view of human 
language, one that sees language not as a kind of transparently 
Platonic mapping of reality, but rather as a tool developed and used 
for a range of social and theoretical purposes, of discovery, explana­
tion, and justification. While mapping reality is, of course, a central 
function, linguistic pragmatism emphasizes the social context of the 
mapping activity - the way in which our attempts to work out an 
understanding of our social and physical environments are done from 
here, that is from a temporally and spatially limited location, using 
conceptual materials drawn from other activities and projects. 
An example will make this clearer. Take the claim "punishment is 
the merited response of intentionally inflicted suffering to wrongdo­
ers," which might be thought definitional of punishment. According to 
the principle of semantic non-atomism, to understand this claim we 
need to understand as well the related but unmentioned concepts of 
"harm" and "responsibility." Second, a complete understanding of the 
19. See PIERRE DUHEM, To SA VE THE PHENOMENA: AN ESSA y ON THE IDEA OF 
PHYSICAL THEORY FROM PLATO TO GALILEO (Edmund Dolan & Chaninah Maschier 
trans., 1969) (1908); W.V.O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951). 
20. See w.v.o. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960); Donald Davidson, On the Very 
Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS'N 47 (1974), reprinted in 
DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183 (1984). 
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claim and its subsidiary concepts is going to require more than just a 
discursive account. Rather, grasping the concept of punishment means 
understanding the contexts in which punishment is deployed (or ex­
cused), and how punishing relates to practices of compensation or re­
venge. And third, we might want to revise our seemingly definitional 
claim about the connection of punishment to wrongdoing upon en­
countering societies with very different practices. For instance, imag­
ine a culture in which norms of forgiveness in the wake of wrongdoing 
dominate, where people compete to absorb and forgive the greatest 
insults and harms. In such a culture, inflicting suffering on wrongdoers 
would not, "by definition," be merited. What this example is meant to 
show is that what had seemed on its face a single semantic claim about 
the meaning of "punishment" now turns on the relation between pun­
ishment and a congeries of associated social practices - that is, turns 
on the relation between that individual semantic claim and a particu­
lar, contingent, form of life. 
The pragmatic view of language defines a research program in 
philosophy that treats our concepts and ideals as, in Quine's term, 
immanent not transcendent, and so only understandable through an 
exploration of their place in our social and physical world.21 In the case 
of law, immanent exploration means taking legal doctrine and its con­
ceptual skeleton seriously, not just as independent data points which 
an explanatory curve must fit but as a systematic phenomenon whose 
parts interrelate both conceptually, in being mutually illuminating, and 
practically, in sustaining a form of social life whose complexity and 
value are recognizable to us as both inhabitants and explorers. 
The antithesis of immanent exploration, by contrast, is reduction, 
especially as practiced by the legal economists who serve as Coleman's 
foil in the first part of the book. Reductions of some phenomena are 
helpful - explanatory - when they transform the relatively mysteri­
ous into the familiar, or thereby relate an apparently singular phe­
nomenon to a range of disparate phenomena, permitting unified theo­
retical treatment. Famously, the reduction of heat to molecular motion 
does both these things; equally famously, attempts to reduce mental 
states like beliefs and desires to neural firings has done neither, giving 
up a rich and explanatory theory of human agency for a "science" of 
the brain unable to explain the mind's most salient feature, its inten­
tionality.22 
For Coleman, economists' reduction of tort law's language of the 
"duty of care" to "efficiency" is like the reduction of the mental to the 
21. W.V.O. Quine, Replies to Davidson, 19 SYNTHESE 303, 305 (1968). For a fuller dis­
cussion of the immanent method, see w.v.o. QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND 
OTHER ESSAYS (1969). 
22. For a polemic along these lines, see JOHN SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE 
MIND (1992). 
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physical, impoverishing rather than enriching our understanding. This 
reduction is most explicit in economists' endorsement of the "Learned 
Hand test" for negligence, according to which a failure to take precau­
tions against causing injury is negligent just if the cost of precaution is 
less than the cost of the possible injury, discounted by the probability 
of its occurrence.23 (So, for instance, carmakers shouldn't be deemed 
negligent for failing to install $10 bumpers if there were only a 0.1 % 
chance of a driver causing at most $9,999 in injuries.) The Learned 
Hand test may make good sense as social policy in deciding when it is 
reasonable to demand injurer compensation, since the incentives it 
creates for potential injurers have the effect of lowering the net social 
costs of accidents plus precautions - in other words, the true social 
costs for the potentially injurious activity. But the question of its gen­
eral reasonableness as social policy and its fairness as between the two 
parties are two very separate things. Imagine, for example, that it is 
very costly for a shipping company to ensure that its drivers do not 
drink on the job, but that its drivers do sometimes drink, and when 
they do, they cause accidents. The car owner whose car is dented by a 
drunken driver will have a legitimate grievance against the company, a 
grievance expressed morally as "you need to clean up the messes your 
workers make," whose normative force persists even if, as a matter of 
overall policy, society is best off leaving the loss with the car owner. 
The grievance persists because it expresses a fundamentally rela­
tional dimension of morality, the responsibility of the injurer for the 
injury to the victim; the Learned Hand test, by contrast, expresses a 
non-relational dimension of morality, the responsibility of each to 
bear costs when that maximizes social welfare. The two dimensions, 
traditionally catalogued as deontological vs. utilitarian, compete in the 
reasons they offer, and it is obvious that one is not fully reducible to 
the other. Utilitarianism, of which welfare economics is a special form, 
assesses acts by reference to whether they will produce more or less 
overall welfare in the relevant population; deontological theories, by 
contrast, assess acts by their conformity to principles of right - for 
example, whether an act expresses disrespect for a particular person, 
or whether the act honors a previous commitment. 
Take the old chestnut of the deathbed promise: Franz asks his old 
friend Max to swear to burn Franz's book manuscripts upon his death, 
and Max so promises. But after Franz's death, Max reads them and 
realizes they are works of genius, sure to bring pleasure to the world. 
What should Max do? For a utilitarian, the matter is obvious: there is 
no welfare gain from keeping the promise in this instance, while pub­
lishing brings a clear gain. But to the deontological moralist, serious 
about the principle that promises ought to be kept, the case poses a 
23. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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problem because the promise itself creates a powerful, if not decisive, 
reason to burn the manuscripts. A utilitarian might try to end up in the 
same place, by arguing for example that welfare is enhanced by our 
internalizing rules of thumb regarding promise-keeping, rules that 
should be put aside when welfare runs strongly the other way. But this 
argument would imply that any sense of dilemma Max feels is just a 
matter of irrational carryover, that if he saw things clearly, he would 
see he had no reason to honor the promise.24 And this seems wrong: 
any adequate account of human morality - one aiming to be true to 
both the phenomenology and the practice of promise-making and 
moral deliberation - has to recognize the deep force of both sorts of 
reasons, utilitarian and deontological. For what is at stake, in Max's 
deliberations and in morality's place in our lives generally, is both 
Max's particular relation to Franz, to whom he has made a commit­
ment, and his relation to humanity in general. Relations to friends, 
family, promises, neighbors, the world at large: these structure our 
lives, puzzle us, and divide our loyalties. Utilitarianism, in its rede­
scription of our relations to particular others in terms of our relations 
to humanity in general, fails to take seriously the complexity of our 
normative relations to others. 
Coleman's argument against the economic approach to tort law 
mirrors the debate between deontology and utilitarianism. Tort doc­
trine's "bilateral" structure, in Coleman's term, reflects the relational 
dimension of morality, in its confrontation of injurer and victim. In 
this sense, Coleman says, tort law deeply expresses the corrective jus­
tice principle that "individuals who are responsible for the wrongful 
losses of others have a duty to repair the losses" (p. 15). All the central 
issues of tort law - who may be liable, and under what conditions -
presuppose this principle, for all involve a confrontation between an 
injured plaintiff and an ostensible injurer. This is in fact the heart of 
Coleman's argument against the economic approach to tort law. Tort 
law fundamentally concerns what to do about what has happened. 
Economics, by contrast, is fundamentally oriented around the future; 
its concern is how to structure incentives so that future costs will be 
minimized. Within economic analysis, an accident's importance is 
purely epistemic Q! informational: it can reveal where attractive pres­
sure points lie, where incentives might better be tailored, so that the 
future will be unlike the past (pp. 15-17). Beyond this role, however, 
24. A utilitarian will also argue that Max has a reason to keep his promise because 
breaking it might encourage others, in non-welfare-maximizing circumstances, to break 
theirs - or will cause worry to those trying to settle their estates. But this response seems 
basically ad hoc, turning as it does on empirical predictions about the effects of promise 
breaking. It is also unprincipled, for it fails to apply when the promise breaking would not be 
known to anyone - yet presumably Max would still regard himself as facing a dilemma in 
this case. For discussion, see Samuel Scheffler, Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 1 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). 
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the fact that A hurt B is of no economic concern; it is merely a sunk 
cost.25 
More generally, as Coleman argues, economists have no principled 
way to limit their field of view to these two parties. Indeed, it is an 
open question whether liability might better lie with some independ­
ent third party who, for whatever reason, is in a better position yet to 
take precautions. To continue an example above, perhaps truckers' 
mothers are in the best position to check the sobriety of the drivers, 
and so ought to be liable for any future accidents in order to encour­
age them to check their children's drinking. If economic analyses stop 
short of casting the liability net so widely, there are only two possible 
reasons: either the contingent fact that the best cost-minimizers are, in 
fact, injurers or victims; or a failure by legal economists to realize how 
revisionary the instrumental conception of tort law really is to actual 
doctrine. Either way, economics fails to account for the deepest fea­
ture of tort law, its concern to repair a past harm, and thus it fails as an 
explanation of tort law in general. 
Of course, the forward-looking perspective of economics is present 
in contemporary tort law, most notably in products liability,26 as well, 
arguably, in older doctrines such as respondeat superior. But these in­
cursions of instrumentalism occur at the margins, as exceptions to the 
bilateral logic of tort law. Coleman's claim, to be sure, is not that de­
partures from the corrective justice model are unwarranted, or that a 
frankly revisionary conception of economic theory should not guide 
institutional reform. Even the plaintiffs' bar could not argue with a 
straight face that tort law, with all its costs, is the only just way for a 
society to deal with accidental harm. Coleman, indeed, recognizes the 
possibility that we might be better off scrapping the tort system for an 
alternative, for example New Zealand's general no fault insurance 
scheme (p. 59). The central point of his argument is simple: a theory of 
what tort law is must respect, not eliminate, its basic structure; and the 
economic approach to tort law fails to do this. 
This flaw at the heart of the economic approach would seem to be 
fatal, but Coleman goes on to discuss some other ways an efficiency­
centered account of law might be helpful even if it fails as a conceptual 
reduction. The first is if economics offered a "functional explanation" 
of the sort favored by evolutionary psychologists. A functional expla­
nation of something - say, a structure such as the eye, or a practice 
such as altruism - tries to show how the fact that it furthers some goal 
25. Judge Hand's deployment of the cost-benefit test for negligence is thus only partially 
compatible with law and economics, since it assumes that liability will lie, if at all, only with 
the injurer. Full-bore economic analysis, however, must consider the whole universe of po­
tential cost-minimizers. 
26. The locus classicus in American tort law is Justice Traynor's concurrence in Esco/a 
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. , 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944). 
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explains its presence. On an evolutionary account, the fact that (some) 
species have eyes is explained functionally, by the fact that eyes en­
hance survival. Creatures with eyes are likely to be more successful in 
reproducing, and so passing on the eye trait, than creatures without 
eyes. Thus, assuming a mechanism for generating the eye trait in some 
individuals (random mutation in evolutionary theory), and a filtering 
process by which the trait can spread through a population (reproduc­
tive competition and heritability), the presence of eyes is explained by 
their function of enhancing survival. 
An economist trying to make a similar case for tort law would ac­
cept the complex, relational structure of tort doctrine, and then try to 
show how the presence of that structure, as a whole, is explained by its 
function of enhancing efficiency. But this is not easy, for it involves 
showing, first, that the structure of tort law does, in fact, enhance effi­
ciency - at least relative to other systems of social organization that 
might have emerged - and, second, that there is some plausible fil­
tering process through which the tort system, complex relational struc­
ture and all, has emerged because, in fact, it maximizes efficiency. But, 
as Coleman argues, no such explanations are on the horizon (p. 27). 
While economists have argued whether particular rules within tort law 
are, or are not, efficient, they have not taken up the task of arguing 
that tort law as a whole promotes efficiency. And even if that claim 
were accepted, no one has shown evidence for a filtering mechanism 
by which efficiency-promoting structures, rather than others, would 
come to dominate social practice. While there are today some eco­
nomically-oriented judges on the bench, that is a very recent phe­
nomenon and it can't help in explaining structures of tort doctrine 
dating from English common law. So the functional explanation is a 
nonstarter. 
Coleman next considers whether an efficiency-centered account 
might work as what Ronald Dworkin has called a "constructive inter­
pretation" of tort law. An account provides a constructive interpreta­
tion when it shows a practice or institution in its best light, making it 
the "best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to 
belong."27 To take Dworkin's example, a reading of MacBeth that in­
terpreted the play as a murder mystery rather than as a tragedy would 
fail as an account of that play, not because the murder mystery ac­
count could not explain all the features of the play - there are lots of 
bodies lying around, after all - but because such an interpretation 
would make it a bad murder mystery rather than a powerful tragedy. 
For Dworkin, understanding what a thing is is essentially a matter of 
seeing what it is for, what it does best. So, if economic analysis pro­
vided a constructive interpretation of tort law, it would have to show 
27. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 52 (1986). 
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why ordering tort law around efficiency reveals it as, in some sense, a 
more attractive institution than do other plausible accounts. But, as 
Coleman persuasively argues, interpreting tort doctrine in terms of ef­
ficiency does not seem to reveal its structure in an attractive light; 
rather, it seems to impose upon its structure an alien organizing prin­
ciple, for the reasons discussed above (p. 31). Second, there's simply 
no reason to think that the value of efficiency does make tort law 
more attractive than does corrective justice. If efficiency is where we 
want to go, then tort law under any interpretation may not be the way 
to get there. (Similarly, someone looking to read an entertaining mys­
tery would do better to pick up an Agatha Christie novel than to force 
such an interpretation on MacBeth.28) 
Finally, Coleman considers whether the economic account of tort 
law might nonetheless be more attractive than the corrective justice 
account because the economic account manifests the explanatory vir­
tue of "consilience," or the ability to explain many different, related 
phenomena with a single concept. Coleman suggests that if we expand 
the scope of the economic account beyond efficiency, to the more 
general goal of risk-regulation, then we might get an account of tort 
law that lets us see how tort law fits together with contract law, prop­
erty, and perhaps even criminal law (pp. 37-38). In fact, the success of 
economics within the legal academy is largely a product of its pur­
ported success in providing a unifying treatment of isolated doctrinal 
puzzles. Coleman's argument at this point is more generous to eco­
nomic analysis. He grants that, to the extent economic analysis ex­
plains tort law at all, it does so in a way that permits tort's explanatory 
unification with the rest of private law, and then some. But, Coleman 
argues, in perhaps the most interesting chapter in this part of the 
book, the corrective justice account is also nicely consilient. For not 
only are the central concepts of corrective justice - agency, responsi­
bility, duty, repair - found throughout our social practices, but the 
corrective justice account of responsibility for misfortune can help to 
illuminate what Coleman sees as the basic idea of distributive justice: 
who owns what costs? As Coleman and Ripstein argued in "Mischief 
and Misfortune,"29 the question for tort law concerns the costs of acci­
dents, and the question for distributive justice concerns the costs of 
congenital misfortune, such as being born poor, or disabled, or untal­
ented. Examination of corrective justice reveals that there is no non­
normative, purely naturalistic way of assigning costs to agents. Heroic 
attempts, notably by Richard Epstein, have been made to make causa-
28. This, indeed, is consistent with a general criticism of Dworkinian constructive inter­
pretations: that making something the best it can be may, in fact, make it into something 
else. 
29. Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 7. 
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tion the key to assigning liability for accidents;30 and by Dworkin to 
make "brute" versus "option" luck the basis for assigning responsibil­
ity for congenital misfortune.31 But Coleman and Ripstein show -
convincingly to my mind - that neither causation nor luck on their 
own can determine the content of a scheme of justice. Causation is too 
promiscuous a concept: any necessary condition of an event is a cause, 
the driver driving or the pedestrian walking. And what makes congeni­
tal bad luck so hard to bear, and thus a proper object for action by re­
distributive institutions, is a prior conviction that undeserved harms 
warrant compensation. In both cases, what does the work is a more 
basic conception of "the requirements of political fairness as reciproc­
ity among free and equal persons" (p. 45). And thus the elements of 
the corrective justice account can illuminate two bodies of normative 
theory initially thought fully distinct. On grounds of consilience, then, 
corrective justice scores at least a tie. 
Coleman's argument for the superiority of the corrective justice 
account in illuminating tort law is highly persuasive. Indeed, 
Coleman's refutation of the economic approach is so persuasive that 
the reader may well wonder whether anyone today seriously holds a 
belief for economics as a descriptive account of tort doctrine. This is a 
fair question, since Coleman provides no references to economists 
making the descriptive claim, and the principal work setting out the 
descriptive account, by Richard Posner and William Landes, is now 
twenty years old. It is true that the economic account does still play a 
significant role in legal pedagogy, where its descriptive and normative 
aspirations are rarely disambiguated; and it is prominent in descriptive 
accounts of transactional law, such as contracts. But it would appear 
that the economists have already abandoned the descriptive project in 
tort for the greener pastures of reform, or for the evaluation of the 
relative efficiency of particular rules rather than the system as a whole. 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, two of the most influential legal 
economists working today, describe their own work as wholly norma­
tive, a technically sophisticated utilitarianism.32 Their argument in tort 
law is that legal policies should promote social welfare, which is 
maximized by efficiency-centered approaches, not ill-defined notions 
of justice or fairness.33 This approach takes on corrective justice as a 
normative, not a descriptive matter. Of course, it presumes that the 
structure of tort law is sufficiently compatible with the value of effi­
ciency that reform, rather than scrapping the whole, is a live possibil-
30. Epstein, supra note 4. 
31. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY (2000). 
32. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 
(2001). 
33. Id. at 1039-52. 
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ity. In that sense, economists like Shavell and Kaplow may fail to rec­
ognize the radical alternative to corrective justice that economics pre­
sents. But even if they are right about the possibility of insinuating a 
forward-looking value into the structure of a backward-looking doc­
trine, they need not be interpreted to claim that tort law is already ori­
ented around efficiency. Coleman's criticisms largely pass by them, 
and most other legal economists working today. 
In any case, the real interest of the economic account lies in its 
service as a foil for Coleman's own demonstration of the pragmatic 
method in normative theorizing. Much modern moral and political 
philosophy begins from within our experience, often in the form of 
"intuitions" whose epistemological status as deliverances of some ex­
ternal moral reality rather than conventional prejudice always seems 
suspect. On the other hand, forms of moral and political philosophy 
that begin with very general theoretical principles, such as that the 
good consists in aggregate happiness, and then argue back to the 
norms and practices constitutive of everyday life, seem basically alien 
to the particular and partial perspectives of human agency. The virtues 
of Coleman's pragmatic approach, by contrast, are the generosity of its 
scope and the modesty of its objectives. Starting from the rich material 
of our actual practice, the kind of coherent and holistic explanation 
pragmatism insists upon results in a theory of tort liability that shows 
its complex relation to human agency, social justice, and moral re­
sponsibility. At the same time, because Coleman does not claim that 
the corrective justice account is independently morally justified or self­
justifying - he acknowledges the obvious point that there are surely 
better ways of allocating accident costs than private litigation - his 
account avoids the charge of conservatism that dogs intuitionist ac­
counts. On the other hand, Coleman's account makes clear how thor­
oughgoing a revision the economists propose, not just to our legal 
landscape, but to the individualistic perspective on agency to which 
the corrective justice account is intimately bound. 
Ill. PRAGMATISM AND THE NATURE OF LAW 
The second half of the book is chiefly devoted to a distinct prob­
lem: how to make sense of law's claim to authority. The authority of 
morality's commands lies in their intrinsic goodness or rightness. Law, 
by contrast, seems to command us to do or refrain simply because we 
are commanded. Its authority is or purports to be independent of the 
goodness of its dictates. This claim might be, and has been, denied in 
two ways: by anarchists, who deny the authority of law; and by "natu­
ral lawyers," who see law's authority as stemming from its capacity to 
help us realize the good. But explicating the familiar thought that "be­
cause it's the law" seems to provide a prima facie reason for obedience 
is the challenge taken on by legal positivists. Modern legal positivism 
May 2002] Pragmatism Regained 1653 
descends from H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, the most important 
work of legal philosophy of the last century.34 According to Hart, law's 
authority depends only on the existence of a social convention among 
a group of people, who would agree in their collective practice that 
' certain norms - don't steal, written promises are to be kept or dam­
ages paid - were to be recognized as obligatory and so obeyed or de­
viations therefrom criticized. The law's authority for those people is 
simply a matter of their accepting it as authoritative - a bootstrap ar­
gument of sorts. (A noteworthy feature of this account is that because 
law's authority extends only to those who accept it, legal positivism 
takes no position on the political philosophical question whether law 
has any authority over subjects who do not accept the convention as 
reason-giving but merely abide by it, for example out of fear.) The 
convention observed by this group, whose practice is generally obeyed 
by others, is called the "Rule of Recognition;" the "rule" is the set of 
criteria according to which certain norms are recognized as law, not 
just as bits of social morality.35 
Many criticisms have been raised against the conventionalist ac­
count, chief among them Ronald Dworkin's argument that conven­
tionalism fails to capture the disputatiousness of legal practice: the 
ubiquity of argument about what the law is on some point despite the 
clear absence of any conventional answer.36 A different criticism of 
Hart's account, and of its adumbration in Coleman's "Negative and 
Positive Positivism,'' has been made by Scott Shapiro.37 According to 
the most widely-accepted theory of convention, that of David Lewis,38 
to say that a social practice is conventional is to say that the parties to 
that practice have preferences with a particular structure: each party 
to the practice prefers most to conform to whatever the general prac­
tice is, than to engage in any particular form of the practice. To adapt 
an example of Lewis', many people adopt a convention that when a 
cell phone call is dropped, the caller is the one who calls back.39 This 
convention is maintained not because there's any inherent justice in 
the caller calling back, but because the most important thing is to have 
some settled convention so that each party doesn't meet a busy signal. 
Conventions are, in technical language, solutions to coordination 
34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). 
35. What characterizes a legal system, or "law" in a general sense, according to Hart, is 
the existence, manifest in social practice, of a rule of recognition, as well as primary conduct­
guiding norms; secondary power-granting norms, for example governing how to make bind­
ing agreements; and other secondary norms governing legal change. Id. at 94-95. 
36. DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 135-39. 
37. Scott J. Shapiro, Laws, Plans and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 
2002) (manuscript on file with author). 
38. DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969). 
39. Id. at 5 .  
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problems: problems individuals face when they need to act together to 
act successfully, but could act together in any number of ways. 
As Shapiro points out, the social practice governing what counts in 
a community as law seems quite unlike a convention, for the parties to 
that practice have strong preferences concerning what criteria to use 
in determining the law; they don't prefer conformity of any kind. In 
the United States, for example, legal officials share a practice of refer­
ring to the Constitution to determine in part what counts as law; this 
practice is stable not just because the Constitution was selected as a 
coordination point and all prefer to coordinate around something. 
Rather, officials coordinate around the Constitution because each be­
lieves it sets out the proper criteria for what counts as law. More gen­
erally, it certainly doesn't seem to be a necessary feature of a commu­
nity's rule of recognition that it be followed as a convention, in Lewis' 
sense, for it could be followed for all sorts of reasons. And this poses a 
problem for the traditional positivist account. 
Coleman's subtle and valuable discussion of the social foundations 
of law provides an answer to Dworkin's criticism. Rather than seeing 
law's authority as residing in an unreflective convention among offi­
cials, Coleman suggests that is a product of their active, reflective -
and disputatious - cooperation. (Think of how a boxing match is both 
cooperative, the fighters accepting a common set of rules and trying to 
put on a good show, and competitive, each struggling for his preferred 
outcome.) Coleman's use of the term "cooperation" is technical and 
draws on recent and influential work by the philosopher Michael 
Bratman, as well as work by Shapiro.40 Roughly speaking, persons co­
operate when their intentions to engage in some activity manifest a 
particular, interlocking structure: each person attempts to be respon­
sive to the actions and intentions of the other participants; each is 
committed to the success of the activity, and moreover to its successful 
realization via cooperative activity; and each is committed to helping 
the other participants to achieve the shared goal (p. 96). 
Agents who are cooperating are not necessarily in full agreement. 
You and I may be cooperating in planting our garden together, each 
committed to sharing expenses, digging the beds together, and work­
ing out together what to plant in them. But we may be deeply divided 
about what to plant, you preferring vegetables and me flowers. Our 
cooperative plan to build the garden does not determine this issue, but 
it does create a background for, and structure our, bargaining over the 
question of what to plant (p. 97). For if we weren't committed to gar­
dening together, we would not be constrained at all by considerations 
of what the other is willing to accept, or by the budget we have jointly 
40. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
INTENTION AND AGENCY (1999). 
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pooled and so forth. Cooperation thus accounts for both agreement 
and the nature of our disagreement. 
In the case of law, Coleman suggests that judicial practice can be 
understood as cooperative in Bratman's sense: judges are mutually re­
sponsive, through doctrines of precedent; mutually committed to the 
existence of a stable, institutional practice of adjudication; and mutu­
ally helpful, through practices of appellate review (pp. 96-97). At the 
same time, the kind of disagreement that has captured Dworkin's 
imagination, Coleman argues, is well accounted for by the cooperative 
model. What is shared by legal officials in a community is not any par­
ticular set of legal criteria, as in Hart's account, but a commitment to a 
project - to working out, acrimoniously if need be, what the commu­
nity's law should be. It is this shared commitment to a project that ex­
plains how a community comes to have law; and the particular trajec­
tory this shared practice takes explains why it has the law it does. The 
invocation of pragmatism here is more implicit than explicit, but no 
less real: while positivism's virtue lies in situating the abstract concept 
of law in a particular set of social practices, its vice was not looking 
closely enough at the actual structure of those practices. The shift 
from convention to cooperation reflects a pragmatic commitment to 
finding law's structure in actual practice, and so provides an object les­
son in the pragmatic approach.41 
One question does remain: has Coleman, by eliminating the con­
ventionalist basis of positivism, thereby relinquished his claim to a dis­
tinctively positivist theory?42 For even a natural law adherent could 
41. I should say that while I favor the general approach advanced here by Coleman, I 
think the cooperative model still fails to take seriously enough the extent of disagreement at 
the foundation of law - principally because many participants in legal practice lack the mo­
tivation of mutual helpfulness. I prefer a weaker model of collective action to cooperative 
action. See Christopher Kutz, The Judicial Community, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 442 (2001 ) . 
42. This argument is pushed very hard by Dworkin in his review of Coleman. Ronald 
Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1660-63 (2002) (reviewing The Practice 
of Principle). As I understand it, Dworkin's central point seems to be that when positivists 
rely on social action defined in such abstract terms as, for example, "cooperatively attempt­
ing to determine the community's criteria of legality," they forgo the chief functional advan­
tage claimed by traditional positivism: the idea that what defines a community's law is a 
strict function of its members' convergent behavior and critical attitudes. Thus, in principle 
an observer could determinately read off the law from an account of the commonalities in 
participants behavior and attitudes. 
True, when the traditional positivist notion of a convention is weakened to Coleman's 
point, convergent behavior and attitudes no longer serve to identify the content of a com­
munity's law - for the simple reason that Coleman, recognizing the force of Dworkin's ar­
gument for pervasive controversy, no longer claims that participants' behavior must con­
verge. But Coleman's claim for positivism is metaphysical, not epistemological, as I argued 
above: positivism's virtue is that it gives a true account of what makes a given proposition 
valid law in a community, namely its logical relation to the cooperative practices of legal of­
ficials in that community. Coleman's positivism may therefore be useless in the hands of an 
observer trying to divine a community's law from its practices, but it still makes a clear and 
controversial claim about law's nature, and thus stands as an alternative to legal theories, 
like Dworkin's, that make legal validity turn necessarily on moral merit. 
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claim that law's social foundation is cooperative in a relevant sense: 
under natural law theory, judges cooperatively seek to determine what 
are the morally best standards of law. The cooperation here, however 
is only of sociological interest, analogous to the observation that, say, 
experimental physics consists of scientists cooperatively trying to de­
termine the constituents of the universe. What distinguishes natural 
law theories from positivist ones is the normative role played by the 
sociological observation. In positivist theories, the cooperative be­
havior of the judges makes it the case whether a given proposition 
counts as valid law; the judicial behavior fixes the truth of legal propo­
sitions. 
To return to the physics example, positivism in law is thus equiva­
lent to social constructionism in science, according to which scientific 
claims count as true just because they are so acknowledged by a com­
munity of inquiry; according to scientific realists, by contrast, the truth 
of those claims depends only on whether they reflect the way the 
world is. Since Coleman insists that the cooperation of social officials 
is itself what fixes the truth of legal propositions - or, more precisely, 
what fixes the criteria for what counts as law in that community - his 
abandonment of conventionalism does not entail abandoning positiv­
ism. Though I myself doubt that the cooperative picture of judicial be­
havior is fully adequate to the fractious nature of actual legal practice, 
Coleman is clearly moving in the right direction in order to save the 
positivist project from the meager foundations in unreflective conven­
tion that it set for itself. 
There is a great deal more of jurisprudential interest in the second 
half, including a long discussion of the question whether legal positiv­
ism can accommodate the evident role of moral principles in particular 
legal systems - for example the principle in U.S. law that the legal 
process comport with "fundamental fairness." This question is often 
referred to as the question whether "inclusive" or "exclusive" legal 
positivism is true, "inclusive positivism" being the view that moral cri­
teria can count as part of a community's law whenever social practice 
by legal officials makes them relevant to legal decisionmaking. "Ex­
clusive positivists" hold that whether or not legal officials sometimes 
deliberate using moral criteria, a community's "law" in the strict, defi­
nitional sense cannot include those terms. For instance, Raz, the 
leading exclusive positivist, has influentially argued that because law's 
function in a positivist understanding is basically to resolve conflict 
without resort to moral argument, if moral principles play a role in le­
gal systems, it is not as "law" but rather as binding extra-legal deci­
sional standards.43 Shapiro has argued, relatedly, that if law functions 
to guide conduct, then the law must make a "practical difference" to 
43. JOSEPH RAZ, The Identity of Legal Systems, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra 
note 9, at 78, 100. 
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an agent's deliberations about what to do, either by motivating the 
agent or identifying for her what she should do.44 But if the law merely 
says, in effect, "do what morality says," then the law is not making a 
difference; morality is. For law to make a practical difference, it must 
do so by virtue of its mere legality, that is by virtue of its form and in­
dependent of its content. Moral norms, by contrast, guide conduct by 
virtue of their content, and so moral standards cannot be part of law, 
on pain of compromising its guidance function. 
Against these arguments, Coleman defends the common sense 
view voiced by Hart45 that if law is at root conventional, then some of 
those conventions could, in fact, incorporate moral principles as ele­
ments of law. I cannot do justice to Coleman's full response to Raz 
and Shapiro, particularly to the care with which he explores their 
views. But the general nature of his response is to acknowledge the 
force of their claims in defining the general character of law as a social 
institution, an institution whose function clearly is to provide an 
authoritative and decisive guide to conduct. As Shapiro and Raz ar­
gue, this function may well be a virtually defining feature of law: a 
community whose "law" consisted of the rule "act morally" (or con­
sisted of nothing but more specific rules, such as "contracts must be 
honored when it would be immoral to break a promise," and "tort 
damages must be paid whenever there is a moral duty of compensa­
tion,") would not really be a community in which law existed in any 
interesting sense. But, as Coleman points out, all this can be true of 
"law" in the sense of a "legal system," without holding true of every 
particular law. For surely some laws, at the margin, can fail to serve as 
uncontroversial or content-independent guides to conduct without un­
dermining the general guidance function of law (p. 144). If some laws 
can include moral norms, then the rule of recognition for a legal com­
munity can include moral criteria, such that at least occasionally legal 
validity will turn on moral validity. Hence inclusive legal positivism is 
consistent with law's generally guiding conduct without reference to 
moral norms. 
Coleman's pragmatism seems like an especially healthy interven­
tion in this debate for a broader reason, which is the puzzling persis­
tence in legal theory of claims about the "conceptual necessity" of le­
gal systems having certain features.46 Philosophers generally, in our 
post-Wittgensteinian and Quinean age, have tended instead to reject 
claims about conceptual necessity, particularly in the case of artifacts 
44. Shapiro, supra note 9. 
45. In the Postscript to Concept of Law, Hart said that he regards Coleman's position in 
Negative and Positive Positivism as a fair statement of his own. HART, supra note 34, at 250-
51 . 
46. See Dworkin, supra note 42, at 1680, for a similar point, although mysteriously di­
rected against Coleman. 
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and social practices. What, after all, is a conceptually necessary feature 
of a chair, or (famously) of a game? For any feature one can name, 
there will be some variant of the thing or activity with plausible claim 
to the title yet lacking the feature. Legal systems are obviously enor­
mously complex, and complexly situated, institutions, which serve or 
claim to serve a great range of different functions among communities 
whose members take very different stances towards them and their 
authority. Compare a piece of showboat legislation, self-evidently 
never to be implemented or enforced, with a core element of the 
criminal law, such as the prohibition of murder. The way these differ­
ent examples of law relate to citizens' self-understanding, institutional 
expectations, and broader questions of moral and political theory are 
so different that no single, rigid functional characterization of a legal 
system's aims can adequately encompass them both.47 
Pragmatism's appeal lies in its shrugging off of claims of concep­
tual necessity, in favor of a more supple analysis of the way and degree 
different features of legal systems satisfy different functional demands. 
Here the relevant question is: what degree of content-dependent guid­
ance is consistent with the existence of a legal system? The answer to 
this question is partly empirical, partly conceptual. We can, and do, 
imagine a legal authority functioning as an authoritative system even if 
it delegates to agents some responsibility for reasoning morally about 
its requirements; yet at a certain point we cease being able to imagine 
such a system as law at all. Pragmatism tells us such a conclusion is 
what we should expect, for our concepts are children of our practices; 
they are made for our world, it is not made for them. 
If one side of Coleman's pragmatism is his insistence that concepts 
get their content from their social contexts, its obverse is his view that 
concepts are not simply reducible to those contexts. This point, that 
concepts and conceptual structures can be the legitimate object of 
philosophical study, marks Coleman as a kind of moderate among 
fellow pragmatists. In the concluding portion of the book, Coleman 
defends conceptual jurisprudence against two, more radically prag­
matic, alternatives: the "normative jurisprudence" advocated by 
Dworkin and the "naturalized jurisprudence" proposed by Brian 
Leiter. 
According to Dworkin, jurisprudence is not a matter of giving a 
neutral description of law's nature, but a morally committed attempt 
to justify or criticize how applications of state power flow from a re­
gime's particular history and body of principles; legal argument is per­
force moral and political argument. Dworkin's insistence that claims 
about what law is only make sense as ways of achieving moral and po-
47. Exclusive positivism's semantic maneuver, counting deviant instances as legally 
binding but not law, seems to me a stubborn insistence on maintaining a thesis in the face of 
recalcitrant facts. 
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litical goals thus significantly extends the basic pragmatic orientation 
around practice. In Coleman's view, however, Dworkin mistakenly 
moves from the weak but plausible claim that an account of law 
should enable us, at the end of the day, to see the value of legal gov­
ernance, to the implausibly strong claim that the only way to produce 
such an account is by starting from moral premises. 
Leiter, by contrast, follows both Quine's repudiation of traditional 
epistemology and last century's "Legal Realists" in seeking to explain 
adjudication not in terms of law's logic, with its famous indetermina­
cies, but rather through the causal explanations offered by psychology 
and political science. Against Leiter, Coleman points out that the psy­
chologists and political scientists would have no well defined problem 
space in which to work - no legal system to study - without the kind 
of internal account of law's nature that conceptual jurisprudence aims 
to provide. 
Coleman's arguments here are probably unlikely to convince his 
opponents. Dworkin simply denies what Coleman asserts, namely the 
availability of an external, uncommitted perspective on a regime's law 
on the grounds that only the committed perspective reveals the non­
conventional moral standards he thinks pervasive in actual adjudica­
tion. Leiter, meanwhile, could well accept the aprioristic stage-setting 
role of jurisprudence and still think it is time for philosophers to close 
up shop, leaving the difficult questions about law's operation to social 
science. (In a sense Dworkin and Leiter both represent more extreme 
versions of pragmatism than Coleman himself.) 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In his recent (and peculiarly sour) review of Coleman's book, 
Dworkin complains about the insularity of contemporary legal phi­
losophy, whose practitioners "teach courses limited to 'legal philoso­
phy' or analytic jurisprudence in which they distinguish and compare 
different contemporary versions of positivism . . .  attend conferences 
dedicated to those subjects, and . . .  comment on each other's ortho­
doxies and heresies in the most minute detail in their own dedicated 
journals."48 Coming from a member of the academy, Dworkin's bleak 
description is bizarre in three ways: first, of course, because that de­
scription characterizes all of academic life, not just legal philosophy. 
Second because its bleakness seems a product of an alienated outsider, 
unable to perceive the excitement and interest of the debates to which 
his own writings have contributed so influentially. Indeed Dworkin's 
remark seems to reflect precisely the uncharitable interpretive stance 
48. Dworkin, supra note 42, at 1678. 
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he deplores as a matter of jurisprudence; it seems committed to seeing 
opposing views in their worst, not their best, light.49 
Third, and most importantly, this book, in particular, ill deserves 
the charge of pedantry. Rather, Practice of Principle is exceptional for 
the fresh air it breathes into old debates, blowing aside the dust of 
tangential debates and leaving clean a work area in which beautiful 
philosophy proceeds. 
49. For that matter, the extensive political philosophical debate on equality to which 
Dworkin has also notably contributed - whether inequalities are best measured in terms of 
Rawlsian "primary goods," economic welfare levels, Sen-ic capacities, or Dworkinian re­
sources - could be characterized in precisely the same terms by an outsider insisting on de­
ploring it. Yet that debate, for all its occasionally claustrophobic tendencies, has clearly done 
a great deal in making clearer what is at stake in questions of justice and equal treatment. 
